Improving Homeownership Among Poor and Moderate-Income Households by Adam Carasso et al.
Asset ownership is vital to households
seeking to expand opportunity, solidify
family finances, and hedge against eco-
nomic uncertainty. No asset is more impor-
tant in achieving these objectives than
owner-occupied housing.1 Indeed, home
equity is the primary source of private
saving for most middle-income house-
holds, exceeding both retirement plans 
and savings accounts.2
While 69 percent of all households 
are headed by homeowners—a record 
high reached in 2004—many are left out.
Only half of the households in the lowest
fifth of the income scale are homeowners,
and the homeownership rates among both
blacks and Hispanics are slightly under
fifty percent.
Of course, homeownership is not for
everyone. Some families have unstable
monthly incomes and few liquid assets.
When these families face an income loss,
they may be unable to meet mortgage pay-
ments and could face foreclosure. For such
families, renting may be more economically
sensible. Renting may also be the best option
for families that expect to move frequently. 
However, these exceptions do not
excuse the strong disincentives to home-
ownership created by existing policies,
which often cut off public benefits for those
who own. U.S. housing programs that
account for the bulk of housing assistance
to low- and moderate-income households,
by their design, discourage ownership of
housing.
The bulk of housing assistance is deliv-
ered through favorable treatment under the
federal individual income tax. This favor-
able treatment comes in three parts. First,
unlike owners of rental housing, home-
owners do not include in their taxable
income the equivalent of the rent money
they save by owning a home. Except for
individuals and families who do not have
taxable income, all homeowners therefore
pay lower taxes as a result. By comparison,
saving that takes place in a fully taxable
asset, such as a savings account, is not
directly sheltered from tax. However, the
second part is that homeowners who item-
ize on their taxes can deduct their mort-
gage interest payments and property taxes
from their taxable income—these tax
deductions effectively cancel out the tax
homeowners would otherwise owe on fully
taxable interest-bearing assets like a sav-
ings account. Third and finally, homeown-
ers are usually not taxed on the capital
gains from the resale of their homes.3
The wealthiest households receive the
greatest benefits from these tax provisions
because they have higher homeownership
rates, occupy more expensive housing with
bigger mortgages, and are more likely to
itemize their tax deductions. For these 
reasons, their income for tax purposes is
understated to a greater extent than the
income of poorer households. Also, as the
wealthy have higher marginal tax rates,
these exclusions from income lead to larger
tax savings. Low- and moderate-income
homeowners receive smaller benefits from
these tax provisions because the untaxed
return to savings in their homes is smaller,
fewer of these households itemize, and
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their low or zero marginal tax rates
yield modest or no tax savings. 
All this means that any real at-
tempt to create an “ownership” society
by expanding asset ownership among
those with modest means must 
confront housing policy head-on. 
Rates of Homeownership 
As we can see in table 1, generally,
homeownership is higher for families
with children than for other house-
holds, and higher for two-parent
families than for one-parent families.
Recent gains in ownership rates can
be attributed to a variety of factors: a
decline in mortgage interest rates, the
expansion of the subprime market,
and mortgage underwriting innova-
tions and related policy develop-
ments—particularly in the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) and
at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—that
tend to keep interest rates lower and
to make mortgages more freely avail-
able, even to those with little money
for a down payment.4
If we look more closely at the
data, households showed significant
improvement in homeownership
after 1990, but much of that was a
catch-up for losses in the 1980s. For
the longer period between 1980 and
2003, those in the bottom fifth of
income have seen no gains in home-
ownership, holding roughly steady
at 51 percent. Even among all home-
owners, the rate only increased by 
0.6 percentage points, although other
sources do show some gains after
2003. A Center for Housing Policy
study (2004) cites the relative rise in
one-parent families, who clearly have
lower incomes than two-parent fami-
lies, and who comprise a growing
share of the bottom income groups,
as a probable cause for the small
gains in the lowest income group. 
Homeownership is cheaper than
renting for long-tenured dwellers.
Even for some lower-income house-
holds, the tax gains from owning can
more than offset the cost of selling
their homes if they have to move.
However, several factors make it
more difficult for the poorest house-
holds to become homeowners. They
have a greater difficulty saving the
money necessary for a down pay-
ment. They typically must pay higher
interest rates due to their higher
credit risk. Even a standard mortgage
requires monthly payments that, in
the early years, often exceed the mar-
ket rents payable for the same home.
Over the 1989–2001 period,
whites have a markedly higher own-
ership rate (70–75 percent) than
blacks or Hispanics (40–50 percent),
although the latter two groups have
clearly gained ground (figure 1).
Blacks and Hispanics have lower
ownership rates than other racial
groups, even after controlling for
their level of income and other eco-
nomic or social characteristics.5
College graduates enjoyed own-
ership rates rising from 70 percent to
about 76 percent over the 1989–2001
period, while slightly over half of
high school dropouts owned a home.
Trends in Federal 
Low-Income Rental 
Housing Assistance
Federal subsidies for housing fall into
four categories:
1. Outlays that subsidize renters or
builders of rental housing;
2. Outlays that subsidize owners;
3. Tax provisions that subsidize renters
or builders of rental housing; and
4. Tax provisions that subsidize
owners. 
Outlay policy toward renters and
builders has undergone a revolution
TABLE 1.  Homeownership Rates, 1980–2003
Source: The Urban Institute 2005. Based on data from the March Current Population Survey, various years. When
the gap increases, the disparity between Overall and 1st Quintile rises; when the gap decreases, the disparity falls. 
Note: Different surveys and data sets report slightly different homeownership rates for any given year. Moreover,
the Census Bureau uses several different surveys (such as the Current Population Survey, the American Housing
Survey, the American Community Survey, the decennial Census, and the Housing Vacancy Survey) to construct
various measures of homeownership. For example, in 2000, the decennial Census reports the national homeown-
ership rate as 66.2 percent, the Housing Vacany Survey reports it as 67.4 percent, and the March Current Popula-
tion Survey, which we use, reports it as 67.2 percent for that same year; other surveys estimate both higher and
lower numbers. To glean more about differences among select surveys, please see http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/housing/homeownershipfactsheet.html (accessed May 2005).
Percentages Percentage point change
1980 1990 2000 2003 1990–2003 1980–2003
All households
Overall 67.9 63.9 67.2 68.5 4.6 0.6
1st quintile 51.2 45.8 48.2 51.0 5.2 –0.3
Gap 16.7 18.1 19.0 17.5 –0.6 0.9
All households without children
Overall 65.2 63.6 66.6 67.4 3.8 2.1
1st quintile 55.9 52.0 53.7 54.9 2.9 –1.0
Gap 9.4 11.6 12.8 12.5 0.9 3.1
All families with children
Overall 72.1 64.7 68.5 70.8 6.1 –1.3
1st quintile 36.2 27.5 29.6 37.7 10.2 1.5
Gap 35.9 37.1 38.8 33.1 –4.1 –2.9
Married couples with children
Overall 78.6 73.2 77.1 77.8 4.6 –0.8
1st quintile 45.8 40.9 42.3 49.0 8.2 3.2
Gap 32.8 32.3 34.9 28.8 –3.5 –4.0
Single parents with children
Overall 43.6 34.5 39.9 42.4 7.9 –1.2
1st quintile 28.6 18.5 21.7 26.7 8.2 –1.9
Gap 15.0 16.0 18.3 15.7 –0.3 0.7
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in recent decades. Partly in response
to dissatisfaction with large public
housing projects and the cost of sub-
sidized private construction, the
Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has, since the
early 1970s, been moving away from
outlays that subsidize new construc-
tion or assistance for families living in
subsidized projects (Olsen 2003a).
This bipartisan shift has turned HUD
toward subsidizing renters through
more flexible, less location-specific
vouchers. 
The trend toward vouchers
becomes less clear-cut once the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)
is factored into the equation. The
LIHTC subsidizes developers of low-
income housing through substantial
credits. Its expansion represents a
shifting backward toward subsidiz-
ing suppliers of housing and renters
who live in tax-subsidized projects.
So while HUD outlay programs have
shifted to household-based vouchers,
the tax subsidies for low-income
housing construction work in the
opposite direction.
Experience with
Homeownership Programs
for Low-Income Households
Outlays to support low- and moder-
ate-income homeownership are much
smaller than those directed toward
rental housing. Historically, the
largest programs of this type have
been HUD’s Section 235 and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s Section
502. However, the HOME Investment
Partnerships Program enacted in 1990
has provided homeownership assis-
tance to the largest number of addi-
tional households over the past
decade. In addition, the Housing
Assistance Supply Experiment, a
component of the 11-year Experi-
mental Housing Allowance Program
run by HUD contractors from 1971 to
1982, provided housing assistance as
an entitlement to the poorest renters
and homeowners in two metropolitan
areas.
Section 235. Congress enacted
the Section 235 Homeownership
Program for Low-Income House-
holds in 1968. This program had two
components—one for newly built
housing and the other for existing
structures. Under the new construc-
tion component, HUD allocated the
limited subsidies available to selected
builders and used various adminis-
trative mechanisms to prevent them
from charging above-market prices.
Under both components, HUD dele-
gated responsibility for informing the
public of the existence of the program
to members of the real estate indus-
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FIGURE 1.  Homeownership Rates by Race and Educational Attainment, 1989–2001
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try. However, local FHA Insuring
Offices did not advertise the program
nor did they seek out potential eligi-
ble buyers. Rather, they informed
participants in the real estate indus-
try—brokers, builders, and mortgage
lenders—of the terms of the program
and waited for them to bring in appli-
cants. In large part due to this design
flaw, sellers were able to sell homes at
above-market rates. Further, the com-
bination of low or zero down pay-
ments, housing purchased in areas
with low capital appreciation (or
actual depreciation), and the inclu-
sion of many families poorly pre-
pared for homeownership led to high
foreclosure rates, as some households
ended up with negative equity in
their homes after owning just a few
months or years (Olsen 2003b). As a
result, Congress eventually termi-
nated the program. Over its history,
Section 235 subsidized roughly half a
million households.
Section 502. The Department of
Agriculture’s Section 502 Rural Home
Ownership Direct Loan Program pro-
vides direct loans to rural homeown-
ers seeking to purchase homes or
refinance existing mortgages. Over 
its 50-year history, the 502 Program
has loaned over $51 billion to nearly 
2 million households. In 2001, more
than half a million loans were out-
standing, with 15,000 new direct
loans made annually. In contrast to
Section 235, this program has experi-
enced few problems.
HOME. The HOME Investment
Partnerships Program allocates fed-
eral block grants to state and local
governments to spend on any type of
housing assistance subject to certain
limits on the incomes of the house-
holds served, the cost to acquire and
develop units, and the rents that may
be charged for rental units. Over its
first decade, this program has pro-
vided homeownership assistance to
about 270,000 homebuyers. Because
HOME is an active program, and
because different localities take differ-
ent approaches to delivering home-
ownership assistance, it is the best
source of information about the per-
formance of different delivery sys-
tems. To date, little has been learned
about any effect of the program on 
its intended beneficiaries, and the 
cost-effectiveness of alternative ap-
proaches has not been studied.
Experimental Housing
Allowance Program. The Housing
Allowance Supply Experiment 
operated an entitlement housing
allowance program for ten years in
the 1970s and 1980s in St. Joseph
County, Indiana (which contains
South Bend) and Brown County,
Wisconsin (which contains Green
Bay). The poorest 20 percent of the
families in the two counties were eli-
gible to receive assistance. The 
general structure of the housing
allowance program in the Supply
Experiment was the same as the
Section 8 Voucher Program that 
HUD operated from 1983 until its
merger with the new Housing Choice
Voucher Program, except that home-
owners were eligible to participate 
in the Supply Experiment. (Lowry
1983). About 42 percent of recipients
were homeowners. Since the home-
ownership component of the experi-
ment operated without any problems,
its design surely contains lessons for
the administration of current home-
ownership programs.
Other Programs. Several pro-
grams helped expand ownership by
lowering borrowing costs. Mortgages
backed by FHA, Fannie Mae, and
Freddie Mac include an implicit inter-
est rate subsidy because of federal
government involvement. In a new
proposal, the FHA would loan house-
holds 100 percent of the costs of buy-
ing a home. While such an initiative
will likely expand homeownership, 
it may also lead to higher mortgage
loan delinquency rates. Pressure by
the government to expand subprime
lending has also probably expanded
the availability of ownership oppor-
tunities. However, subprime lending
has a higher-than-average delin-
quency rate, so it is not clear how
much further that type of effort can
be pushed. Table 2 shows the differ-
ences in delinquency and foreclosure
rates between the prime and sub-
prime markets. While 1.12 percent of
prime mortgages are seriously delin-
quent, 7.36 percent, or nearly seven
times as many mortgages, are in
arrears in the subprime market.6
Congress has authorized a home-
ownership option under the Housing
Choice Voucher Program, and HUD
issued final regulations in October
2000. However, few housing authori-
ties have adopted the option, and
only a few hundred subsidized
renters use their subsidy for home-
ownership. One important reason 
for the limited adoption of the 
homeownership option is that the
regulations impose substantial
administrative burdens on housing
authorities without a commensurate
increase in administrative budget.7
Overall Pattern 
of Housing Subsidies
Direct outlay programs for low-
income renters represent a modest
part of the federal budget for hous-
ing. By far the largest housing 
subsidies are tax subsidies for 
homeowners. 
Table 3 summarizes federal 
housing outlays and tax expenditures
over 1996–2010. As of 2005, the di-
rect outlays total $41 billion, most of
which HUD spends on programs like
Section 8 and public housing. In 2005,
TABLE 2.  Loan Delinquency Rates, 2003
a Defined as the number of mortgages 90 or more days delinquent plus the number in foreclosure status. 
Source: Gramlich 2004. Based on data from the Loan Performance Corporation.
Overdue
Foreclosure Serious
Mortgage type 30 days 60 days 90+ days Status Delinquencya
Prime 2.26 0.58 0.64 0.48 1.12
Subprime 6.75 2.12 3.98 3.38 7.36
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the largest of tax expenditures taken
together—the mortgage interest
deduction ($68.9 billion), the capital
gains exclusion on home sales 
($32.8 billion), the exclusion of net
imputed rental income on owner-
occupied homes ($28.6 billion), and
the property tax deduction ($16.6 bil-
lion)—at about $147 billion, represent
more than three-and-a-half times all
direct outlays on low-income hous-
ing assistance.8 This amounts to
roughly $1,960 in subsidies per
owned dwelling in fiscal year 2005.9
A U-Shaped Housing Benefit
Curve. To gain a comprehensive view
of the distribution of housing benefits,
we allocated the nation’s major hous-
ing subsidies (public housing, Section
8 housing vouchers, and mortgage
interest and property tax deductions)
across income classes. We used data
from the March 2002 Current
Population Survey and the Urban
Institute’s Transfer Income Model
(TRIM). Figure 2 illustrates the U-
shaped nature of overall benefits. 
At the bottom of the income distribu-
tion, the outlay subsidies are almost
entirely for renting. Families in the
second quarter of the income distribu-
tion receive almost no subsidies—their
income is too high for rent subsidies
and too low to gain much from tax
preferences. Middle-to-high-income
households receive tax subsidies that
are typically much larger: along with
more income, they have tax rates as
well as mortgages, property taxes, and
capital gains that are higher than
among those with lower income.10 
Low-income families actually
face negative incentives to buy. Since
the rental and public housing subsi-
dies almost never can be converted
into ownership, they effectively dis-
courage ownership. Figure 3 shows
the distribution of housing ownership
subsidies—treating the subsidies for
renting as negative subsidies for
owning. The inescapable conclusion
is that our patchwork of federal
housing subsidy programs pays
higher-income households to own
their homes while paying some low-
income households to rent.
Figures 2 and 3, which rely on
survey data, do not take into account
several major programs that affect
subsidies and are not reflected in the
surveys. These are the excess of the
untaxed gross rental income over and
above interest and property tax costs
(which flows to all homeowners as a
result of owning their own home);11
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
that subsidizes builders who in turn
pass some fraction of these subsidies
on to renters;12 and the development
of a subprime lending market, which
improves affordability for many low-
income owners. However, integrating
these other programs into the analy-
sis is likely only to make some of the
differentials even starker, as its pri-
mary effect is to make the subsidies at
the higher end of the income scale
become even larger. 
Future Research and Policies
A roundtable of experts convened at
the Urban Institute in August 2004 to
examine housing ownership sug-
gested several policy and research
ideas. They include the following: 
 The United States may have reached
a limit on realizing the ownership
gains that arise from credit liberal-
ization alone. Perhaps the goal now
in this area should be to better
insure that current low-income
homeowners can retain their homes
partly by building up equity.
TABLE 3.  Total Federal Housing Spending by Category and Size, 1996–2010
(In billions of 2005 dollars)
a The lion’s share goes to Section 8 and public housing, but also includes homeless assistance, rural housing assis-
tance, and other HUD programs.
b Totals the following items: exception from passive loss rules for $25,000 of rental loss; exclusion of interest on
owner-occupied mortgage subsidy bonds; deferral of income from post-1987 installment sales; and accelerated
depreciation on rental housing (normal tax method).
c Tax expenditures are not strictly additive due in part to interaction effects among different tax provisions.
Source: The Urban Institute 2005. Based on data from the Budget of the United States FY 2006, Analytical
Perspectives, Table 19-1 and unpublished Table 25-13. Converted to 2005 dollars using GDP implicit price deflator.
1996 2000 2005 2010
Outlays
Discretionary housing assistancea $31.34 $31.80 $37.22 $33.84
Military family housing 4.50 3.77 3.94 3.98
Veterans housing (mandatory plus 
discretionary) 0.08 0.38 0.79 0.21
Mandatory housing assistance 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.03
Mortgage credit (mandatory plus 
discretionary) –5.59 –3.68 –1.03 –4.58
Total outlays 30.44 32.27 40.96 33.47
Tax Expenditures
Deductibility of mortgage interest on 
owner-occupied homes $55.87 $66.57 $68.87 $92.79
Capital gains exclusion/deferral on 
home sales 23.08 20.48 32.84 64.98
Exclusion of net imputed rental income 
on owner-occupied homes 22.91 27.29 28.60 40.44
Deductibility of state and local property 
tax on owner-occupied homes 18.69 24.45 16.59 11.56
Credit for low-income housing 
investments 3.06 3.55 3.85 4.38
Otherb 10.13 12.61 7.36 1.24
Total Tax Expendituresc 133.74 154.95 158.11 215.38
Total Federal Housing Spending $164.18 $187.22 $199.07 $248.84
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 Better data are needed to improve
our understanding of housing pro-
grams as a whole. A start would be
to produce better data sets by 
(1) linking the American Housing
Survey to administrative data on
assisted households in all govern-
ment housing programs, (2) select-
ing larger samples of assisted
households, and (3) adding low-
income observations to the Survey
of Consumer Finances. 
 Studies of the behavior of renters
versus owners requires following
households over time to see how
they react to a variety of different
incentives. At the moment, we 
do not know how many renters
would prefer to own but face seri-
ous obstacles to buying a home. 
 With the expansion of low-income
housing tax credits, new research
is needed on how the benefits of
tax credits are distributed among
developers, nonprofit organiza-
tions, and low-income households;
the program’s cost-effectiveness
relative to vouchers; and any
increased bias tax credits create
against homeownership. 
 Current data indicates that contin-
ued work is required to identify
specific barriers to homeowner-
ship by race, ethnicity, culture, or
language—including whether con-
centrating subsidies on renting
deters ownership, not just among
low-income individuals, but in
areas where low-income groups
are concentrated. 
 Tracking is required to determine
the extent to which homeowner-
ship rates will decrease in response
to increases in interest rates.
 A significant change in incentives
(both for households and for offi-
cials such as those in housing
authorities) is required if housing
programs are to allow subsidized
households to own, as well as to
rent. A similar but not identical
change in incentives is required if
subsidized households are to be
more readily allowed to move to
better jobs and schools outside
their housing authority area.
 Most importantly, the bottom of
the U-shaped curve should be 
leveled out—perhaps by leveling
out the tax subsidies available to
individuals throughout the income
distribution. 
Notes
1. See, for example, Di, Yang, and
Liu 2003 and Sinai and Souleles
2003.
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FIGURE 3.  S-Shaped Curve: Average Annual Federal Housing Incentives (Subsidies and Tax
Deductions) by Total Household Income
Source: The Urban Institute's Transfer Income Model (TRIM) 2004. The sample is restricted to individuals under 65
years of age.  
Notes: Chart includes households without subsidies and counts federal public or subsidized rental subsidies as nega-
tive housing incentives.  Deductions include mortgage and property tax deductions. Not included are the exclusion
of net imputed rental income; deductions such as the exception from passive loss rules for $25,000 of rental loss; or
accelerated depreciation on rental housing.
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FIGURE 2.  U-Shaped Curve: Average Annual Federal Housing Benefits (Subsidies and Tax
Deductions) by Total Household Income
Source: The Urban Institute's Transfer Income Model (TRIM) 2004. The sample is restricted to individuals under 65
years of age.  
Notes: Chart includes households without subsidies. Housing subsidies include federal public or subsidized housing
subsidies. Deductions include mortgage and property tax deductions. Not included are the exclusion of net imputed
rental income; deductions such as exception from passive loss rules for $25,000 of rental loss; or accelerated deprecia-
tion on rental housing.
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2. Based on our own tabulations of
wealth using the 2001 Survey Of
Consumer Finances; and Di 2003. 
3. Assuming the sellers lived in the
home (as opposed to renting it
out) for two years out of the prior
five years. See IRS Publication 523
for details. 
4. See, for instance, Duda and Belsky
2001; Gates, Perry, and Zorn 2002.
Another driver of the increase in
homeownership rates may be the
joint decision in 1990 by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac to drop
underwriting guidelines that had
required single women applying
for mortgages to have cosigners.
5. A finding from using the 2001
Survey of Consumer Finances to
regress homeownership (via a
logit) on an array of economic,
household, and demographic
variables. This corresponds with
similar findings in Bostic and
Surette 2000, who used the 1998
Current Population Survey.
6. Mortgage revenue bonds and
community development block
grant funds are also used to subsi-
dize homeownership for low- and
moderate-income households.
However, there have been few, if
any, serious studies of the eco-
nomic effects of either program.
7. For example, housing authorities
must provide extensive counsel-
ing to recipients.
8. Here, we use the traditional mea-
sure of housing subsidy, namely,
numbers from the government’s
tax expenditure budget. 
9. We arrive at this figure by divid-
ing $147 billion by 75 million
occupied owner households in
2005—our estimate based on the
Census Bureau’s 2004 fourth
quarter data on the national hous-
ing inventory.
10. Collins, Belsky, and Retsinas
(1999) make similar observations
about the incentive effects of
homeownership within the fed-
eral income tax and the disparity
between the sums spent on hous-
ing through tax expenditures as
compared to outlays.
11. A renter pays for the privilege to
live somewhere whereas an owner
lives “rent free”—economically
equivalent to someone else pay-
ing him rent on which he is not
taxed.
12. See Olsen 2003a.
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